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THE QUEST OF DIOGENES
The ghost of Diogenes, with lantern in hand and searching for the
honest man, is still stalking across this land of ours. Times have changed
but the quest for truth is still with us. The lantern of Diogenes has been
replaced in many cases by modern scientific techniques of crime detec-
tion. But the answer to Pontius Pilate's question to Jesus some 2,000
years ago, "What is truth ?" is still being sought in our halls of justice.
The forensic scientist has made great progress in his search for truth,
but it may be that such a goal may never be really attained until we
are able to probe and read the innermost recesses of man's mind.
During my studies, I have discovered two principles of proof which
may be succinctly stated as follows:
(1) Truth is like an iceberg-most of it is submerged. Priestly.
(2) Truth is a sleeping dog-let it lie! Conrad.
THE MYTH OF FRYE
In 1923 the United States Court of Appeals in the celebrated case of
Frye V. United States' set up the polestar guiding the forensic scientist:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult
to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of
the principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well rec-
ognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. 2
Lawyers and scientists have accepted this principle of scientific proof
and the courts have solemnly restated this test many times. While the
principle had some merit in rendering the results of lie detector or
polygraph tests inadmissible, the quoted rule was antiquated on the
day of its pronouncement. Under the principle of the Frye case, no sci-
entist could testify that an atom could be split, that atomic fission was
* City Attorney, Madison, Wisconsin, B.A., 1932, J.D., 1934, M.A., 1938 Univer-
city of Wisconsin. New York University Summer School, Vanderbilt School
of Law, 1959, Lecturer in Law, University of Wisconsin, School of Law, 1954-
1960. Professor of Law, College of Law, Syracuse University, 1958-1960. Mem-
ber New York and Wisconsin Bars. Author, "Modern Trial Evidence," "Wis-
consin Evidence," and numerous articles in the field of law and scientific
evidence. Member, American Law Institute; Fellow and President, American
Academy of Forensic Sciences.
1293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923).
2 Id. at 1014.
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useful or that Man could implant his footsteps on the moon. The arti-
ficial and already obsolete principle established by the Frye case, requir-
ing general scientific acceptance of the instrumentality of proof in the
particular field in which is belongs, stood unchallenged, despite the fact
that it was in direct contradiction to liberal rules of admissibility of
expert testimony. However, late in 1958, a California intermediate ap-
pelate court relaxed the requirements set forth in Frye. in ruling that
the results of the Nalline test were admissable to prove a state of drug
addiction, the court observed:
Each of the People's experts did admit on cross-examination
that the medical profession generally is unfamiliar with the use
of Nalline and, therefore, it cannot be truthfully said that the
Nalline test has met with general acceptance by the medical pro-
fession as a whole, general acceptance being at present limited to
those few who deal in the narcotic problem.
Should this fact render the testimony inadmissible? We be-
lieve not. All of the medical testimony points to the reliability
of the test. It has been generally accepted by those who would be
expected to be familiar with its use. In this age of specialization,
more should not be required. 3
THE COPPOLINO CRITERION
Frye and Williams were steps in the development of a system of
admissibility of scientific evidence. The next step was supplied by a
Florida District Court of Appeals in Coppolino v. State.4 The case in-
volved the use of complex, lengthy and impressive scientific and medical
testimony, both by the prosecution and the defense, as to the cause of
death of Carmela Coppolino, whose body was exhumed four months
after her death. Her husband was later charged with her murder.
The prosecution pathologist testified that the deceased was in good
health at the time of her death, and at the conclusion of the autopsy
after the exhumation of her body he was not able to determine the cause
of death, although he found no natural cause. He did find a needle
injection track in the left buttock. Following the autopsy, he turned
over certain portions of the body tissue to the prosecution toxicologist.
It was suspected that Mrs. Coppolino had died from a dose of succinyl-
choline chloride, a drug which decomposes rapidly and it was therefore
opined by medical and scientific experts that it was impossible to detect
in the human body. The prosecution toxicologist, however, discovered
the means of identifying a component part of the drug. Accordingly,
he testified to a reasonable scientific certainty that the decedent had
received a toxic amount of succinylcholine chloride. The state's pathol-
3 People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 848, 331 P.2d 251, at 253-254 (1958).
4Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. App. 1968), Appeal dismissed without
opinion by the Florida Supreme Court, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), 399 U.S.
927 (1970).
5 Id. at 74-75.
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ogist, basing his opinion on his own negative autopsy and upon the
positive findings of the toxicologist, concluded to a reasonable medical
certainty that the decedent died from an overdose of the drug. The
court admitted the evidence, over objections that the tests on which the
testimony of the toxicologist was based were still in an experimental
stage and did not meet the scientific reliability standard of Frye. A
new test for the admission of scientific evidence was recognized by the
Florida Court of Appeals and was stated in the concurring opinion of
Judge Mann:
The tests by which the medical examiner sought to determine
whether death was caused by succinylcholine chloride were
novel and devised specifically for this case. This does not render
the evidence inadmissible. Society need not tolerate homicide
until there develops a body of medical literature about some par-
ticular lethal agent. 6
Williams and Coppolino demonstrate that courts recognize that the
progress of science demands a new approach to the admissibility of sci-
entific evidence.
IDENTIFICATION BY NEUTRON ACTIVATION ANALYSIS
It has now been established that substances and materials may be
identified by neutron activation analysis, a process developed by Dr.
Robert E. Jervis. The material to be analyzed is made radioactive so that
it emits radiation in the form of gamma rays. This radioactive sample
is then exposed to a scintillation crystal. Every time a gamma ray inter-
acts with the crystal, it emits a flash of light, which is then converted
to an electrical pulse the voltage of which is proportional to the energy of
the gamma rays. An electrical device then sorts the electrical impulses
into energy groups and adds up the pulses in each group, and projects
them graphically on an oscilloscope screen. A comparison may then be
made among two or more substances by examining the kind of quantity
of electrical impulses found in each substance.
The admissibiliay of expert testimony using neutron activation anal-
ysis to identify human hair was considered by the New Hampshire
Supreme Court in State v. Coolidge.8 The material examined was pubic
hair from the defendant found on the victim. The trial court excluded
real evidence of the hair identification based on neutron activation analy-
sis because it was not made in accordance with the procedure established
by Dr. Jervis, and, therefore, was not acceptable to scientists in the field.
6 Id. at 75.
7For a very practical but excellent discussion of the matter, see Watkins, Identi-
fication of Substances by Neutron Activation Analysis, 15 AM. JuR. Proof of
Facts, 115-118 (1964).
s State v. Coolidge, 260 A.2d, 547 (N.H. 1969), citing the author's textbook,
CONRAD, MODERN TRIAL EVIDENCE § 711 (West 1956).
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However, the State's experts, using neutron activation analysis,
identified particles obtained from the homicide victim and from the
accused and testified that they had elements in common in such abun-
dance as to establish a common origin or source. To arrive at their
conclusion, the experts used forty sets of particles at the beginning of
the neutron activation analysis study and four sets were eventually
used for neutron activation based upon their similarity of appearance
under a microscope. Defendant's objections to such evidence took the
following form:
1. The neutron activation analysis test is not generally accepted
in the scientific profession.
2. The technique used was not followed generally by the pro-
fession.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled this expert testimony
admissible because Dr. Jervis' own procedures were followed, even
though Dr. Jervis testified that he would have subjected the particles
to longer periods of radiation. The philosophy of the court is founded
upon the teaching of Williams. The court apparently was unaware of
Coppolino. It should be noted, however, that there was other evidence
connecting the defendant with the crime.9
CONCLUSION
From 1923 until 1958 scientific evidence was placed in the rigid
straightjacket of Frye, which required a scientific test to be generally
accepted by the scientific community. Williams and Coolidge recognized
the specialized nature of science and accepted scientific evidence known
only by a few specialists in the field. Coppolino adopted a more liberal
position: the novelty of tests in the scientific field does not necessarily
render them invalid if they are authenticated by their discoverer; "so-
ciety need not tolerate a homicide until science develops a body of liter-
ature about some particular lethal agent." Hopefully, this reasoning
will aid in the adoption of a system of evidence that changes as research
finds reason for change. Perhaps, we can then more adequately answer
the question, "What is truth?"
9 For other recent cases dealing with identification of substances by neutron
activation analysis, see United States v. Kelly, 420 F. 2d 26 (C.A. 2d 1970);
United States v. Wolfson, 297 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
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